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Millett: Terrors and Marvels: How Science and Technology Changed theCharac

The epilogue also examines disappointments, including the observation that
“the Pentagon still lacks a vision of its
needs for Joint officers and how to prepare and reward them.”
Locher is a graduate of West Point and
the Harvard Business School. He was a
leading Goldwater-Nichols strategist on
the staff of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services. He is the authority on
the detailed political pulls and tugs that
brought Goldwater-Nichols into existence. While Locher strives for a balanced analysis, his commitment to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff reform and his own
key role in that process result in a more
detailed examination of the proponents’
view while giving less detail to the arguments of the opponents. Some of the
opponents he classifies as excessively parochial, while others are characterized as
ignoring obvious system flaws.
Goldwater-Nichols has had an unquestioned major effect on the Joint Staff
process and on officer education. It is
and will be for many years, the subject
of intensive debate and analysis.
Locher’s book will be an important reference in this debate (and in turn, his
article “Has It Worked? The GoldwaterNichols Reorganization Act,” in the
Autumn 2001 issue of this journal, is a
good introduction to it). I strongly recommend that anyone interested or involved in the national security process
read this book. It describes democracy
at work and just how hard that process
can be.
WILLIAM TURCOTTE

Professor Emeritus
Naval War College
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Shachtman, Tom. Terrors and Marvels: How Science and Technology Changed the Character and
Outcome of World War II. New York: William
Morrow, 2002. 360pp. $26.95

Tom Schachtman’s brief history of the
influence of science and technology on
World War II needs less “gee whiz” and
more John McPhee. As in the war itself,
the author’s strategic decisions are critical to the book’s successes and failures.
The successes can be quickly acknowledged. The book is well written.
Shachtman shows a good familiarity
with the oral histories and memoirs of
the most prominent scientists. He is interesting when identifying personalities
and providing biographical material to
enliven the narrative. He also correctly
treats most of the significant scientifictechnical developments of the war: the
exploitation of the electromagnetic
spectrum for command and control,
navigation, and target acquisition;
guidance systems for such ordnance as
acoustic torpedoes and proximity-fused
shells; nuclear weapons; signals intelligence; jet propulsion; and chemical and
biological warfare.
Now I’ll drop the other cyclotron. Terrors and Marvels does too little with too
much, and it suffers from Shachtman’s
attempt to be international and chronological. Except for the fact that somehow the Allies “did better science” than
the Axis (all those refugees from Nazism certainly helped), the author offers
little explanation of how all these Allied
wonder weapons, crypto dominance,
and radar-sonar devices came about. If
Shachtman had written separate chapters on his prize weapons, one would be
far the wiser about the scientific and
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political dimensions of technological
innovation. He is blissfully ignorant of
a decade of writing about the process of
military-technical innovation in the
twentieth century. The book has no
compelling theme or interpretive core.
Although this reviewer usually grimaces
when graduate students invoke such deities as Thomas S. Kuhn and Michel
Foucault, this book would have benefited from more theoretical structure.
Terrors and Marvels might also have
profited from more attention to innovations that did not involve the gallant
struggles of Nobel laureates in physics
and chemistry to convince knownothing politicians and generals to
adopt their latest schemes to win the war.
Storytelling conquers all. From the perspective of military logisticians and
commanders, innovations in food processing, materials research, automotive
engineering, computer technology, synthetics, and chemical explosives were
war winners too. Schachtman gives
them all short shrift. His discussion on
preventive medicine and the treatment
of combat trauma wounds is particularly limited, given the rich multivolume official histories of the U.S.
armed forces medical establishments in
World War II.
Part of Schachtman’s difficulty is that
he really does not know much about
World War II, apparently alternating
carelessly between the books of Martin
Gilbert and Richard Overy—who, of
course, are blameless for his series of
gaffes. A few samples should suffice:
Ishii Shiro’s final rank was lieutenant
general, not major (p. 318); Iwo Jima
was prized as a fighter base and emergency landing site, not a B-29 base
(p. 298); Japanese troops did not land on
Bataan in December 1941, and they did
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not seize “American garrisons at Shanghai and Tientsin,” since the 4th Marines
and 15th Infantry had already departed
(p. 166); the 17 August 1943 Eighth Air
Force raid on “Schweinefurt” [sic] was
made by 230 B-17s, not 376, and German flak accounted for only six bombers
from the 1st Bombardment Wing, which
lost thirty B-17s to German fighters. In
fact, the entire first paragraph of chapter
7 is riddled with fiction. The sparse
account of Allied military medicine ignores a central fact and accomplishment—wounded survival rates were
important but not as important as the
number of American wounded who
returned to a duty status of some sort.
The number of wounded combatants
who lived to fight another day is dramatized in the story of Company E,
506th Parachute Infantry Regiment,
immortalized in word and videotape by
historian Stephen Ambrose. Another
slip is Shachtman’s sketchy account of
the role of operations research and
analysis mathematics; it ignores a massive literature on operations research in
air warfare, logistics, and antisubmarine
warfare—a literature that Shachtman
apparently does not know.
In sum, a single volume on the influence of scientific and technological innovation on World War II would be
welcome. Terrors and Marvels is not
that book.
ALLAN R. MILLETT

Ohio State University

Norris, Robert S. Racing for the Bomb: General
Leslie Groves, the Manhattan Project’s Indispensable Man. South Royalton, Vt.: Steerforth Press,
2002. 722pp. $40
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